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Abstract 8 
Although past findings are inconclusive, there is evidence of a negative relationship between 9 
wealth—at the household and country level—and climate change concern. One explanation 10 
for this relationship is that wealth provides a buffer against the risks of climate change, 11 
leading people in wealthy countries or wealthy households to perceive a greater sense of 12 
control over climate change impacts which in turn results in lower levels of concern. We 13 
tested this hypothesis with data sourced from the OECD Environment Directorate which 14 
conducted a detailed household survey in 2011 of 11 OECD countries (N=10,162). Our 15 
results accord with past studies showing a significant negative relationship between country 16 
and household wealth and individuals’ perceptions of the seriousness of climate change. 17 
Moreover, our findings suggest that this relationship is mediated through sense of control, 18 
measured at the country level by the readiness index and at the household level by the extent 19 
of adoption of energy efficiency improvements. These findings raise the question of how best 20 
to incentivise action on climate change amongst those with the ability - but not necessarily the 21 
motivation - to respond.  22 
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1. Introduction 28 
In November 2017 more than 15,000 scientists from around the world sent a ‘letter to  29 
humanity’ warning of a range of catastrophic environmental calamities, including global 30 
climate change, that imperil the earth’s biosphere (Ripple et al. 2017). This second notice, the 31 
first was signed in 1992 by 1,700 scientists, highlights the mismatch between scientists and 32 
citizens’ level of concern about environmental issues, particularly climate change. Although 33 
polling from around the world shows substantial numbers of people who are concerned about 34 
climate change, there are also significant minorities who are relatively less concerned, for 35 
example, in the US (Leiserowitz et al. 2017); Australia (Lowy Institute 2019); Canada (The 36 
Environics Institute 2014); and some European countries (European Commission 2017).  37 
The extent to which citizens are concerned about climate change is important because 38 
levels of concern can encourage or stymy individual action and undermine the political will to 39 
implement climate change policy. Models of environmental decision-making point to beliefs 40 
and concern as critical antecedents to people taking action to address environmental problems. 41 
For example, the value-belief-norm model (Stern 2000) theorizes that awareness of 42 
consequences influences a person’s sense of responsibility and in turn their sense of personal 43 
obligation to act on behalf of the environment.   44 
If we accept that citizens’ concern about climate change is an important precursor for 45 
climate change action, then the question of what predicts climate change concern becomes a 46 
critically important one. Past research has pointed to a wide variety of characteristics 47 
(including cognitive, experiential, socio-cultural and demographic) that predict individuals’ 48 
beliefs and the way they perceive the risk of climate change (Hornsey et al. 2016; van der 49 
Linden 2017). Recently, researchers have also acknowledged that the material circumstances 50 
of individuals and countries may also relate to climate change belief (Sandvik 2008; Lo 51 
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2016). This focus aligns with the climate change rhetoric that it is those nations and 52 
individuals that have the least ability to cope that will be most vulnerable to climate change 53 
impacts, whereas wealthier nations and people will have the resources to adapt (cf. Kelly and 54 
Adger 2000). This rhetoric foregrounds wealth as an important influence in how concerned 55 
individuals and nations may be about climate change. In the current research we use a unique 56 
and highly detailed OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) 57 
household survey database across 11 countries to focus on the relationship between wealth—58 
of individuals and nations—and the perceived seriousness of climate change. Further, we 59 
explore whether a sense of control can help to explain the relationship between wealth and 60 
climate change perceptions.  61 
2. Household income, national wealth and climate change attitude literature 62 
Past research has shown mixed findings for the relationship between household income and 63 
environmental concern. On the one hand, Franzen and Vogl have demonstrated across 33 64 
nations that respondents in higher income households are more concerned about the 65 
environment (Franzen and Vogl 2013a; 2013b). On the other hand, Lo (2016) found that 66 
higher household income was related to less perceived environmental risk and Milfont et al. 67 
(2014) found no significant relationship between household income and climate change 68 
beliefs.  69 
Research has also investigated the wealth-environmental concern relationship at the 70 
country level drawing on data from large multi-country surveys. Some studies have revealed a 71 
positive relationship: Franzen and Vogl (2013a) found that individuals in countries with 72 
higher Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reported greater environmental concern and Lo and 73 
Chow (2015) found that GDP was significantly and positively associated with the importance 74 
of climate change relative to other environmental issues. Other high quality studies have 75 
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shown a negative relationship such that individuals in higher GDP countries judge climate 76 
change as less serious (Kvaløy, Finseraas and Listhaug 2012; Mostafa 2016; Sandvik 2008) 77 
and rising temperatures related to climate change as less dangerous (Lo and Chow 2015). 78 
Milfont et al. (2014) also found that individuals in regions that were more socio-economically 79 
deprived had greater belief in climate change whereas Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias (2014) did 80 
not find a relationship between GDP and individuals’ strength of climate change concern.  81 
Inglehart’s (1977; 1990) theory of post-materialism has been the main theoretical 82 
framework used to understand the relationship between wealth and environmental concern. 83 
According to this perspective, increasing affluence allows people to shift their focus from 84 
meeting basic needs, to valuing and caring for higher-order issues such as the environment. 85 
Hence, as people and countries attain greater wealth, citizens’ concern for the health of the 86 
environment increases. This perspective has been questioned as studies have shown evidence 87 
that runs counter to the theory (e.g., Dunlap and Mertig 1995; Dunlap and York 2008).  88 
Lo and Chow (2015) advance a distinction that could help to reconcile the 89 
contradictory findings: they highlight that climate change concern has two distinct 90 
components—one that relates to the importance of climate change and one that relates to risk 91 
perceptions. In support of this contention they show that national wealth (GDP) correlates 92 
positively with measures of climate change importance but negatively with climate change 93 
risk perceptions. Lo (2016) argues that wealth and income determine the level of risk people 94 
are willing to take. He contends that those who have less economic resources are less willing 95 
to take risks. In a similar vein, Slovic (1987; 2000) proposes that individuals’ risk perceptions 96 
are affected by the ability individuals have to control those risks. He argues that the ability to 97 
manage and respond to adverse events is tightly linked to individuals’ financial resources; 98 
hence wealthier individuals can more easily ensure against all sorts of risks, recover from 99 
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material damage, or find a place to relocate in case of a forced displacement.1 Higher income 100 
and resources could therefore lead to an increased sense of control about the world and future 101 
outcomes, reduced sense of personal vulnerability and therefore reduced concern about 102 
climate change issues.   103 
The sense of control that individuals may accrue from private wealth may also 104 
manifest at the country level. Wealthier countries are usually better equipped to manage or 105 
avoid adverse consequences of climate change. For example, wealthier countries usually 106 
have: well-functioning insurance markets; large defence and emergency personnel to cope 107 
with natural disasters; options to relocate for those who have to be displaced; increased 108 
infrastructure expenditure to ‘flood-proof’ areas; and adequate social security systems and 109 
relief packages to those affected by a catastrophic event (cyclone, floods etc.) etc. (Lo 2016; 110 
Sandvik 2008). Hence, individuals’ level of climate change concern might be driven not only 111 
by their own ability and resources to cope with the risk of catastrophic events but also by the 112 
level of collective protection their country is capable of achieving.  113 
 This theoretical reasoning provides an explanation for why a negative relationship 114 
might emerge between wealth and climate change concern. It suggests that wealthy 115 
individuals living in affluent countries are less concerned about climate change because 116 
wealth increases their sense of control through having the resources to protect themselves 117 
against the risks of climate change. In other words, sense of control mediates the relationship 118 
between wealth and climate change concern. Although this proposition makes theoretical 119 
sense, to our knowledge it has not been tested in previous research. 120 
In this article we use household data from 11 countries and test the relationship 121 
between household income and country wealth and individuals’ concern about climate 122 
                                                            
1For example, those households who can afford to build a floating house (i.e. a house that rises with the water 
levels) are likely to feel less concerned about future risks of flooding. 
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change. Consistent with the notion that wealth may buffer against perceived risk of climate 123 
change—through increasing individuals’ sense of control—we hypothesise:  124 
 H1: Households and countries with higher wealth will have less concern for climate 125 
change.   126 
H2: The relationship between household and country wealth and their climate change 127 
concerns will be mediated by sense of control.   128 
An important contribution of the current study is to further understand the wealth and climate 129 
change concern relationship through testing sense of control as a potential mediator of the 130 
relationship. As we noted previously, although researchers have theorized that wealth 131 
reinforces the feeling of ‘being in control’ in case of potential adverse effects of climate 132 
change, to our knowledge there has been no empirical test of control—or variables that can 133 
act as proxies of this construct—as a mediator. The following sections describe our attempt to 134 
measure control and its relationship with climate change concerns in 11 OECD countries. 135 
3. Data, variables, and methods for mediation analysis 136 
3.1 Data 137 
Data is sourced from the OECD Environment Directorate which conducted a detailed 138 
household survey in 2011 on Environmental Policy and Individual Behaviour Change in 11 139 
OECD countries: Australia, Canada, Chile, France, Israel, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, 140 
Spain, Sweden and Switzerland; with each online survey sample stratified for age, gender, 141 
income and region. Around 1,000 households were surveyed in each country on their 142 
opinions, attitudes and behaviour related to a number of environmental fields. Delegates from 143 
participating countries and a variety of survey experts designed the survey for each country, 144 
with translations provided for each country. A pilot survey was conducted on 500 people, and 145 
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rigorous stratification and sampling procedures were followed to ensure representativeness 146 
(for further details, see OECD 2014).  147 
3.2 Variables 148 
3.2.1 Dependent and mediating variables 149 
The dependent variable in this study is respondents’ climate change concern, which was 150 
measured on a scale from zero (climate change was regarded as not serious at all) to 10 151 
(climate change was regarded as extremely serious), so that a higher value indicates greater 152 
concern. We construe seriousness of climate change as more likely to reflect the risk 153 
component of environmental concern (cf. Lo and Chow 2015). Wealth at the country level 154 
was measured as Gross National Income (GNI–per capita in 2011, in thousand USD, sourced 155 
from World Bank). The measure of wealth at the household level was collected from the 156 
OECD survey and was household annual after tax income in thousand USD.  157 
Two variables served as proxies for sense of control, our proposed mediator. At the 158 
country level we used the readiness score produced by the University of Notre Dame (US) 159 
through their Global Action Initiative (for further details on ND-GAIN, see http://gain.org). 160 
As described on the ND-GAIN website, the readiness score measures a country’s ability to 161 
leverage investments and convert them to adaptation actions. ND-GAIN measures overall 162 
readiness by considering three components–economic readiness, governance readiness and 163 
social readiness. Economic readiness captures the ability of a country’s business environment 164 
to accept investment that could be applied to adaptation that reduces vulnerability (reduces 165 
sensitivity and improves adaptive capacity). Governance readiness captures the institutional 166 
factors that enhance application of investment for adaptation. Social readiness captures factors 167 
such as social inequality, information and communication technology infrastructure, 168 
education, and innovation that enhance the mobility of investment and promote adaptation 169 
8 
 
actions. The readiness score is measured on a 0-1 scale with higher scores on the index 170 
reflecting greater capacity of the country to attract and mobilize economic resources to cope 171 
with changes in future conditions (see also Lo 2016 for use of the same index).  172 
At the household level, our indicator of control is the ability and the actual actions of 173 
households to install costly energy-saving devices.2 We draw on the energy efficiency-174 
improving index developed in Nauges and Wheeler (2017) for the OECD dataset. 175 
Considerable information on energy behaviour was collected in the OECD dataset, and the 176 
following set of energy-efficient appliances was considered as a form of control in this study: 177 
low-energy light bulbs; energy-efficient windows; thermal insulation of walls/roof; heat 178 
thermostats; solar panels for electricity or hot water; wind turbines; and ground-source heat 179 
pumps. For each of these items, each household gets a score of 1 if it has been installed in its 180 
current primary residence over the last ten years, and 0 otherwise. The index is the mean of 181 
scores calculated over the number of non-missing responses;3 and is standardised to be 182 
between 0-100. A higher score on the index indicates greater household energy-efficiency 183 
adoption which we use as a proxy for greater sense of control over potential adverse climate 184 
change impacts. We reason that adoption of such equipment would give homeowners a sense 185 
of control over their home environment and the environmental stressors (including heat waves 186 
or temperature extremes that could arise from climate change) that might impact on their 187 
lives. Having a greater number of energy efficient and sustainable appliances in the home may 188 
                                                            
2Respondents have not been asked in the survey what the main reason for adopting energy-efficient devices was 
but there is some evidence that cost savings are not the primary driver of adoption. When respondents were 
asked to state the importance of seven factors (using a scale varying from 0 to 10) that would encourage energy 
conservation, the factor which came out as the least important (on average) was: “higher energy prices”, while 
the factor that was considered the most important was: “less expensive to invest in energy-efficient equipment”.  
So the investment cost of the equipment is considered too high for some households but reducing the energy bill 
does not appear as the main reason why they would invest (if they were not budget-constrained). In what follows 
we assume that feeling better protected at home against the adverse effects of climate change such as higher 
temperature and/or longer drought spells is one of the main factors driving the adoption of energy-efficient 
equipment. 
3The score is set to missing if installation of the equipment was not possible (e.g. because the household was 
renting and only the landlord could install the equipment). 
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give people the sense that they are prepared for future environmental challenges and give 189 
them sense of being in control.  190 
 191 
3.2.2 Independent variables 192 
Other independent variables that were used in our regression models were based on findings 193 
from the climate change literature (e.g. van der Linden 2017) and available information from 194 
the OECD survey. The full set of variables used in the regression models are described in 195 
Table A1 and summary statistics are shown in Table A2, both in Appendix A. We consider 196 
the following independent variables:  197 
 Respondent’s and household’s socio-demographic characteristics: Respondent’s 198 
gender, age, and education; household’s children (a dummy variable indicating the presence 199 
in the household of at least one member who is below 18 years of age), household annual 200 
after tax income; place of living (urban or rural area) (Hornsey et al. 2016 meta-analysis 201 
indicates the importance of all these variables), and a dummy variable indicating whether the 202 
household’s energy bill is based on its actual level of energy use (to test whether economic 203 
incentives on energy use can influence climate change concerns, as suggested by the 204 
economic literature; e.g. Ohler and Billger 2014). 205 
Respondents’ attitudes and opinions in different domains were measured including: 206 
trust in information coming from researchers, scientists, and experts (e.g. Hmielowski et al. 207 
2014 showed increased trust in scientists is associated with climate change beliefs); appraisal 208 
of the seriousness of personal safety issues (concern over climate change may be influenced 209 
by broader social, political and economic concerns that are related to it, such as the failure of 210 
the government to protect the public interest; Lo 2016); support of, or participation in, 211 
activities of charitable organisations (see, e.g., Knez 2013 on the links between values such as 212 
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egoism and altruism, and concern for climate change); respondent’s average level of 213 
satisfaction towards the quality of his/her local environment (previous work has found a 214 
negative relationship between quality of local environment and willingness to pay for 215 
environmental issues [Millock and Nauges 2014]); and agreement/disagreement with the 216 
following two statements: “Environmental issues should be dealt with primarily by future 217 
generations” and “Environmental issues will be resolved primarily through technological 218 
progress”. Previous research has indicated the importance of environmental attitudes, as well 219 
as the importance of political ideology (e.g. Hornsey et al 2016; Lo 2016; Nauges and 220 
Wheeler 2017; van der Linden 2017). Answers to the two environmental statements were 221 
used as proxy for political ideology (with agreement indicating proximity to conservative 222 
ideology as found in a cross-national study for developed countries by Nawrotzki 2012, see 223 
Appendix A).4   224 
Country-specific independent variables including: the country per capita GNI in 2011; 225 
the Environmental Performance Index (EPI) which ranks how well countries perform in two 226 
broad policy areas: protection of human health and protection of ecosystems; the average 227 
percentage of the country population that was affected by natural disasters classified as either 228 
droughts, floods, or extreme temperature events in 2009; the number of floods recorded from 229 
1985-2011; the mean temperature over the years 2006-2010 (five years prior to the survey); 230 
the ratio of mean temperature over 2006-2010 to mean temperature over 1911-2010; and the 231 
main orientation of the political party ruling the country in 2011 (van der Linden 2017 232 
provides overview of the literature results to date of these country-specific influences on 233 
climate change beliefs). 234 
                                                            
4Unfortunately our dataset does not include information on race or political ideology. These characteristics could 
be important omitted variables since there is consistent evidence that older white men, living in rural areas, 
identify as a Christian, and who hold conservative political views care less about climate change issues (Lee et 
al. 2015; Hornsey et al. 2016; van der Linden 2017).  
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3.3 Mediation analysis 235 
As previously discussed, we hypothesize that the relationship between wealth (household and 236 
country) and climate change concern is mediated by a sense of control. This mediation was 237 
assessed by whether: i) the readiness score plays the role of a mediator in the relationship 238 
between GNI per capita and climate change concern; and ii) the adoption of costly energy-239 
efficient equipment plays the role of a mediator in the relationship between households’ 240 
income and climate change concern. To test mediation we follow the recommendations of 241 
Baron and Kenny (1986). Although this approach has its limitations, it is one of the most 242 
widely used methods to assess mediation in basic regression models, usually involving only a 243 
dependent variable (Y), an independent variable (X), and the hypothesized mediator (M). The 244 
four steps involve running regression models between the: i) dependent variable (Y) and the 245 
independent variable (X); ii) independent variable (X) and the hypothesized mediating 246 
variable (M); and iii) dependent variable (Y) and both the independent (X) and the mediating 247 
(M) variables. The role of M as a mediating variable is assessed through tests of significance 248 
of the parameters in the three above regressions.5 249 
We follow Baron and Kenny (1986)’s approach to test whether the readiness score is a 250 
mediator for GNI per capita by estimating two regression models: the first one (Model 1) 251 
includes GNI per capita as an independent variable along with the full set of explanatory 252 
variables (combining household- and country-level variables), but excludes the readiness 253 
                                                            
5The identification of a pure mediating effect requires strong assumptions which are likely not to be satisfied 
apart from very specific settings where X features a randomized intervention. These assumptions include: the 
exogeneity of X; no reverse causality (i.e., Y should not cause X); no omitted variable; X and M do not interact 
to cause X; and usual assumptions on the error term. The identification of mediating effects becomes even more 
difficult when the model involves multiple independent variables, as is the case in our study. In such cases it is 
difficult to know with certainty whether the hypothesized mediating variable is a “real” mediator, a covariate, a 
moderator, or a confounding variable (MacKinnon, Fairchild and Fritz 2007). M would be called a confounding 
variable if: M causes both X and Y and ignoring M leads to incorrect inference about the relationship between X 
and Y. M would be called a covariate if: M improves the prediction of Y by X but does not substantially alter the 
relation of X to Y when Z is included. Finally M would be called a moderator if the relationship between X and 
Y differs at different values of M. 
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score. The second model (Model 2) is the same as Model 1 but includes the readiness score as 254 
an additional independent variable. For the readiness score to be a mediator, we need the 255 
following two conditions to be verified: i) the coefficient of GNI per capita is statistically 256 
significant in Model 1 but loses significance in Model 2; and ii) the coefficient of the 257 
readiness score is negative and statistically significant in Model 2.  258 
Models 1 and 2 were specified as mixed multi-level regression models in order to 259 
account for the fact that the models feature independent variables measured at two different 260 
levels: the household or individual, and the country. Mixed multi-level regression models 261 
enable the inclusion of both fixed and random parameters. Fixed parameters assume that the 262 
impact of the variable is the same across all countries while random parameters allow for the 263 
impact of the variable to vary from one country to another. The two models were estimated by 264 
Maximum Likelihood using the 10,162 household-level observations available. A number of 265 
specifications were tested (with different sets of fixed and random parameters), with tables in 266 
the next section presenting the models that provided the best fit. 267 
We could not follow the exact same strategy to test whether the index measuring the 268 
adoption of energy-efficient equipment is a mediator for households’ income due to the 269 
presence of reverse causality (Nauges and Wheeler 2017). Using the same data these authors 270 
showed that households’ climate change concern was a determinant of adoption of energy-271 
efficient equipment, hence leading to a reverse causality problem in models featuring 272 
households’ climate change concern as the dependent variable and adoption index as an 273 
independent variable. Reverse causality creates estimation biases and hence produces 274 
misleading estimated coefficients. We argue that the reverse causality operates at the 275 
household level (the household is better equipped and may hence feel less concerned about 276 
climate change) but that it would be less likely to be observed at a higher level of aggregation 277 
such as the region or state. Hence, in order to test if the adoption index is a mediator for 278 
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households’ income and to avoid estimation biases due to reverse causality at the household 279 
level, we test the mediation model using regional-averages instead of household data. Model 3 280 
(excluding the adoption index, i.e., the hypothesized mediator) and Model 4 (including the 281 
adoption index) are estimated using 162 observations corresponding to regional averages of 282 
all dependent and independent variables. Models 3 and 4 were specified as linear regression 283 
models since mixed multi-level regression models did not prove superior in this case and were 284 
estimated by Ordinary Least Squares. 285 
4. Results 286 
In what follows we graphically illustrate simple correlations between climate change concern 287 
and wealth at the country level (Section 4.1.) and at the regional level (Section 4.2.). We 288 
report and discuss the results of the mediation analysis testing mediation at the country level 289 
(Models 1 and 2; 10,162 observations) in Section 4.3 and the outcome of the mediation 290 
analysis run on the regional-level dataset (Models 3 and 4; 162 observations) in Section 4.4.  291 
4.1 Overview of the relationship between country climate change concerns and 292 
wealth/readiness 293 
Table 1 statistics show that households living in the Netherlands and Australia, two countries 294 
that are relatively wealthy and known to be vulnerable to climate change, expressed the least 295 
concern about climate change (average climate change concern score in the Netherlands: 6.60; 296 
average score in Australia: 6.88), whereas households living in Korea and Chile, the two 297 
countries with the lowest GNI per capita, are the most concerned (average score in Korea: 298 
8.77; average score in Chile: 8.87).  299 
  300 
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Table 1. GNI per capita, households’ annual income and climate change concern  301 
Obs. GNI per 
capita (USD)
Hh annual 
income 
(USD) 
Mean climate 
change concern 
(0-10) 
Chile 1,027 12,290 17,596 8.87 
Korea 1,116 22,620 34,987 8.77 
Israel 1,168 31,170 34,404 7.93 
Spain 1,101 31,280 38,027 7.95 
France 1,227 44,220 49,421 7.40 
Japan 1,043 45,190 62,679 7.54 
Canada 1,122 46,860 54,432 7.35 
Australia 996 50,060 63,076 6.88 
Netherlands 1,301 53,130 50,134 6.60 
Sweden 1,012 56,010 53,848 7.21 
Switzerland 1,089 79,320 80,663 7.48 
Notes: GNI = Gross national income; Hh = household  302 
 303 
Figures 1-3 below further illustrate the negative relationship between wealth and climate 304 
change concern. Figure 1 illustrates the negative relationship between wealth (horizontal axis) 305 
and climate change concern (vertical axis) at the country level: households living in wealthier 306 
countries exhibit, on average, a lower level of climate change concern.  307 
 308 
Figure 1: GNI per capita and mean climate change concern by country 309 
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Consistent with our hypothesis that greater country wealth will be related to greater control—310 
as measured by the readiness index—there is a positive relationship between a country’s GNI 311 
per capita (horizontal axis) and its readiness score (vertical axis), which indicates that 312 
wealthier countries are more resilient and are better prepared for adaptation to climate change 313 
(Figure 2). Countries with higher readiness scores and hence better preparedness and 314 
resilience also exhibit lower average concern about climate change in general (Figure 3). 315 
 316 
Figure 2: GNI per capita and readiness score by country 317 
 318 
AUSTRALIA
CANADA
CHILE
FRANCE
ISRAEL
JAPAN
KOREA NETHERLANDS
SPAIN
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Re
ad
ine
ss 
sco
re
GNI per capita (1,000 USD)
16 
 
 319 
Figure 3: Readiness score and mean climate change concern by country 320 
 321 
4.2 Overview of the relationship between regional climate change concerns and 322 
wealth/adaptation 323 
Figures 4 and 5 consider regional averages of household’s income and climate change 324 
concern computed from households’ responses to the survey. Our data cover 162 regions or 325 
states in total across the 11 countries.6 Similar to the country level, there is a negative 326 
relationship between households’ wealth (here measured by the average households’ annual 327 
income in the region) and the average level of concern about climate change (Figure 4). 328 
                                                            
6In each country the number of regions/states includes: Australia: 8; Canada: 11; Chile: 15; France: 22; Israel: 6; 
Japan: 8; Korea: 16; Netherlands: 12; Spain: 17; Sweden: 21; and Switzerland: 26. 
AUSTRALIA
CANADA
CHILE
FRANCE
ISRAEL
JAPAN
KOREA
NETHERLANDS
SPAIN
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
6.00
6.50
7.00
7.50
8.00
8.50
9.00
0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90
Cli
ma
te 
cha
ng
e c
on
cer
n
Readiness score
17 
 
 329 
Figure 4: Households’ annual income and climate change concern (n=162) 330 
Figure 5 illustrates that higher average regional adoption of costly actions (energy efficiency-331 
improving equipment) is negatively related to average regional climate change concern. 332 
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 333 
Figure 5: Adoption of costly equipment and climate change concern (n=162) 334 
4.3 Testing the role of the readiness score as a mediator of GNI: regression results 335 
Model 1 in Table 2 tests the relationship between household and country wealth and climate 336 
change concern, including the range of control variables described above. The model is 337 
globally significant and the Likelihood Ratio test confirms the better performance of the 338 
mixed multi-level model featuring both fixed and random effects over the traditional linear 339 
regression model (assuming fixed effects only). Results confirm hypothesis H1, that is, the 340 
negative relationship between wealth and climate change concern, both at the household and 341 
country levels. The estimated coefficients of household’s income and GNI per capita are both 342 
negative and highly statistically significant, hence the negative relationship between wealth 343 
and climate change concern still holds while controlling for a set of other known influences 344 
on climate change beliefs. 345 
 346 
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Table 2. Multi-level linear models of respondents’ climate change beliefs combining 347 
fixed and random parameters (n=10,162 household-level observations) 348 
  Model 1 (no mediation) Model 2 (with mediation) 
   Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>t Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>t 
Respondents’ characteristics 
Male   -0.48*** 0.038 0 -0.481*** 0.038 0 
Age 0.001 0.001 0.686 0.001 0.001 0.631 
Higher education -0.049 0.048 0.31 -0.047 0.048 0.325 
Personal safety ranking 0.177*** 0.013 0 0.176*** 0.013 0 
Trust experts 0.353*** 0.048 0 0.354*** 0.048 0 
Charity giving 0.058 0.057 0.316 0.055 0.059 0.349 
Local environment 
satisfaction -0.065*** 0.016 0 -0.065*** 0.016 0 
Conservative ideology -0.295*** 0.067 0 -0.293*** 0.066 0 
Households’ characteristics 
Children 0.082** 0.04 0.043 0.079* 0.04 0.051 
Income -0.004*** 0.001 0 -0.004*** 0.001 0 
Urban location 0.077 0.077 0.314 0.076 0.074 0.302 
Energy use monitored 0.142* 0.074 0.054 0.144** 0.074 0.05 
Country characteristics 
Gross national income -0.07*** 0.016 0 0.014 0.022 0.528 
Overall readiness score - - - -21.12*** 4.7 0 
Environmental performance 
index -0.059 0.049 0.226 -0.308*** 0.067 0 
Extreme climate % -0.097 0.277 0.726 1.649*** 0.433 0 
Floods 1.682*** 0.275 0 2.165*** 0.216 0 
Mean temperature (5 years 
previous) -0.152*** 0.036 0 -0.335*** 0.048 0 
Mean temperature ratio (100 
years previous) 8.117*** 1.499 0 16.322*** 2.072 0 
Right party ruling -0.883** 0.431 0.04 -0.861*** 0.298 0.004 
Constant 1.209 3.667 0.742 23.145*** 5.682 0 
LR test vs. linear model chi2(6):  230.13 chi2(6):  219.11 
 
Prob > 
chi2:  0  
Prob > 
chi2:  0  
Log-likelihood -20969.9 -20961.76 
Wald chi2(19): 755.06 1026.09 
Prob > chi2: 0     0     
Notes: Underlined variables have random parameters. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.  349 
 350 
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Many of the findings relating to respondents’ characteristics are consistent with previous 351 
research: higher concern for climate change was reported by females, respondents with higher 352 
trust in experts, and those who consider their local environmental quality as poor 353 
(Hmielowski et al. 2014; Millock and Nauges 2014; van der Linden 2017; Hornsey et al. 354 
2016)  (Table 2). Our results for 11 OECD countries also align with findings of a strong 355 
influence of political affiliation on climate change attitudes in developed countries (e.g. 356 
Hornsey et al. 2016; Nawrotzki 2012) in that respondents with attitudes aligned with those of 357 
conservative parties are less concerned about climate change. An unexpected finding is that 358 
respondents who are less concerned by personal safety ranking express higher climate change 359 
concern. In relation to household characteristics, respondents who have higher numbers of 360 
children in their household and those that have their energy metered (highlighting the 361 
importance of economic incentives in the sense that prices paid are directly related to use and 362 
hence drive climate change attitudes) express higher concern about climate change.  363 
Regarding country-specific variables, we find that weather events impact the level of 364 
climate change concern: respondents living in countries where there is a higher frequency of 365 
floods feel more concerned, a finding that is consistent with some past research linking 366 
individual experiences of flooding and climate change concern (Spence et al. 2011). Also, 367 
once we control for country average temperature, overall increase in temperature over the last 368 
five years compared to historical average (over past 100 years) is related to higher climate 369 
change concern (cf. van der Linden 2017). Finally, similar to individuals’ political leanings, 370 
the more a country was governed by conservative ideology at the time of the survey, the less 371 
individuals were concerned about climate change. 372 
Estimation results of Model 2 (test of mediation) in Table 2 show that the first 373 
requirement of mediation is verified: the coefficient of GNI per capita loses significance while 374 
the coefficient of the readiness score is negative and highly significant (p<0.01). The 375 
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parameters of the respondents’ and households’ characteristics are almost the same as those 376 
reported in Model 1. However we observe some slight changes in the parameters of some of 377 
the country-specific variables. In particular the coefficient of the variable measuring the 378 
average percentage of the population that was affected by natural disasters classified as either 379 
droughts, floods, or extreme temperature events in 2009 (extreme climate %) now becomes 380 
highly significant. This variable relates positively to climate change concern, which is what 381 
one would expect. This finding is likely to be explained by the fact that country-specific 382 
variables are collinear. Our results thus confirm our hypothesis H2 in that the readiness score, 383 
which measures the capacity of the country to cope and adapt with changes in future 384 
conditions, mediates the effect of country’s wealth on climate change concern. 385 
4.4 Testing the role of the adoption index as a mediator of households’ income: 386 
regression results 387 
We test in this sub-section the role of the adoption of energy-efficient equipment as a 388 
mediator of the relationship between household income and climate change concern using 389 
data at the regional and country level.  390 
Models 3 and 4 were estimated using 162 observations combining regional averages 391 
and country-specific variables (Table 3). Model 3 includes (regional averages) of households’ 392 
income and country’s GNI per capita as measures of wealth. We include the index measuring 393 
the adoption of energy-efficient equipment in Model 4 to test for the role of the adoption 394 
index as a potential mediator of households’ wealth.  395 
 396 
 397 
 398 
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Table 3. Multiple linear regression models of regional climate change concerns (n=162 399 
regional-level observations) 400 
  Model 3 (no mediation) Model 4 (with mediation) 
 Coef. Std. 
Err. 
P>t Coef. Std. 
Err. 
P>t 
   
Respondents’ characteristics (regional average)    
Male   0.046 0.291 0.874 0.320 0.297 0.284
Age -0.014 0.010 0.194 -0.003 0.011 0.752
Higher education -0.348 0.322 0.282 -0.004 0.362 0.991
Personal safety ranking 0.154 0.095 0.107 0.196** 0.097 0.046
Trust experts 0.560*** 0.085 0.000 0.513*** 0.095 0.000
Charity giving 1.146*** 0.358 0.002 0.809** 0.370 0.030
Local environment 
satisfaction -0.150 0.107 0.162 -0.124 0.106 0.245
Conservative ideology -0.262 0.490 0.593 0.225 0.505 0.656
Households’ characteristics (regional average)    
Children 0.034 0.324 0.917 0.076 0.321 0.813
Income -0.009** 0.004 0.030 -0.006 0.004 0.136
Adopt energy-efficient 
equipment - - - -0.013** 0.006 0.028
Urban location  -0.469** 0.190 0.015 -0.528*** 0.188 0.006
Energy use monitored 0.039 0.495 0.938 0.101 0.483 0.834
Country characteristics      
Gross national income -0.007 0.008 0.390 0.012 0.012 0.335
Overall readiness score - - - -7.843** 3.329 0.020
Environmental 
performance index -0.081*** 0.019 0.000 -0.141*** 0.036 0.000
Extreme climate % 0.349*** 0.111 0.002 1.033*** 0.295 0.001
Floods 0.700*** 0.091 0.000 0.941*** 0.121 0.000
Mean temperature (5 years 
previous) -0.088*** 0.013 0.000 -0.159*** 0.031 0.000
Mean temperature ratio 
(100 years previous) 3.380*** 0.532 0.000 6.551*** 1.390 0.000
Right party ruling -0.552*** 0.160 0.001 -0.177 0.200 0.380
       
Constant 6.331*** 1.728 0.000 11.805*** 3.364 0.001
R-squared 0.79   0.80   
Fisher-test: 27.58   26.76   
Prob>F: 0.000   0.000   
Notes: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.  401 
 402 
The overall R-squared is around 0.80 in both Models 3 and 4. Fewer individual characteristics 403 
were found to be significant (compared to Model 1 and Model 2), which is as expected given 404 
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the smaller sample size from using regional averages rather than household-level data. The 405 
coefficient of households’ income is negative and significant in Model 3 while it loses 406 
significance (but remains close to 10% significance) in Model 4 when the index measuring 407 
adoption of energy-efficient equipment is introduced. The index for energy-efficient adoption 408 
has a negative and statistically significant coefficient, confirming hypothesis H2 in that the 409 
adoption of energy-efficient equipment mediates the effect of households’ income on their 410 
climate change concern.7  411 
 412 
5. Discussion and conclusions 413 
In the current study we tested the relationship between wealth and climate change concern—414 
at both the household and country level—and explored whether sense of control might 415 
mediate this relationship. Our findings confirmed the hypothesized negative relationship 416 
between wealth and climate change concern: higher GNI per capita and higher household 417 
income (aggregated at the regional level) were both significantly related to lower climate 418 
change concern. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, we also found that the negative relationship 419 
between GNI and climate change concern became non-significant when sense of control 420 
(readiness index) was included in the regression. Similarly, the negative relationship between 421 
household level income and climate change concern became non-significant when sense of 422 
control (energy-efficiency improving index) was included in the regression.  423 
 The mediation results support the proposition that wealth can act as a buffer against 424 
risks and reduce climate change concern through increasing a sense of control. Countries that 425 
have greater wealth are in a better position to respond to the negative consequences of climate 426 
change which in turns provides citizens with collective protection against climate change 427 
                                                            
7The country-level mediation (through the readiness score) is less convincing when regional-level rather than 
when household-level data is used. That is, GNI per capita is not a statistically significant negative predictor in 
the models that use regional-level household data (i.e. Models 3 and 4). The readiness score is negative and 
statistically significant in Model 4, similar to the findings of Model 2. 
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impacts. Household wealth could also provide this buffering effect, allowing householders to 428 
ensure against climate change risks and to take action to recover if need be. Wealth, at the 429 
country and household level, could therefore afford individuals with a greater sense of control 430 
over climate change risks. Although our findings provide support for this proposition, it must 431 
be acknowledged that we did not have direct measures of sense of control at the country or 432 
household level. Instead, we used an index of a country’s ability to adapt through harnessing 433 
economic, governance and social resources and an index of the extent to which households 434 
had already made their homes energy efficient. We believe these are good proxies for a sense 435 
of control, but future research is needed to confirm this and to test the mediation model with 436 
direct measures of perceived control. In addition, this study only used OECD nations in their 437 
sample, and given that these nations are all relatively privileged, further research should study 438 
the climate change concerns of a greater number and diversity of countries around the world. 439 
 Previous research has shown conflicting findings for the relationship between wealth 440 
and environmental concern with some research showing a positive relationship (Franzen and 441 
Vogl 2013a; 2013b; Lo and Chow 2015) whereas other research revealing a negative 442 
relationship (Kvaloy et al 2012; Lo 2014; Lo and Chow 2015; Milfont et al 2014; Mostafa 443 
2016; Sandvik 2008). Our findings are consistent with those studies that have found a 444 
negative relationship. Consistent with the reasoning of Lo and Chow (2015), we believe that 445 
this is because our measure of climate change concern—perceived seriousness of climate 446 
change—reflects the risk component of climate change concern rather than the importance 447 
component. Other studies showing a negative relationship have also measured the seriousness 448 
of climate change (Kvaløy, Finseraas and Listhaug 2012; Mostafa 2016; Sandvik 2008) or 449 
climate change/environmental risk perceptions (Lo 2016; Lo and Chow 2015). Hence, our 450 
findings provide evidence that the relationship between wealth and climate change concern 451 
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depends on how concern is conceptualized and measured and that, when concern is measured 452 
in terms of risk, the relationship with wealth is negative.  453 
 The finding that wealth—at the country and household level—is associated with a 454 
greater sense of control and less concern for climate change has implications for anyone 455 
seeking to promote climate change action. Living in a wealthy country or being part of a 456 
wealthy household may lead individuals to feel complacent about the consequences of climate 457 
change because they believe that they or their country have the resources to cope with the 458 
negative impacts. Previous research has shown that motivation to take action on climate 459 
change is related to higher risk perceptions (Hornsey and Fielding 2016; O’Connor, Bord and 460 
Fisher 1999; Spence et al. 2011). Hence, the implications of the wealth – climate change 461 
concern relationship may be lower levels of support for climate change policy and less 462 
individual motivation to engage in climate change mitigation actions. This conclusion 463 
highlights an important communication challenge for future researchers, that is, how to 464 
promote action on climate change amongst those with the greatest capacity, yet the least 465 
motivation to act. 466 
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Appendix A 559 
Table A1. Definition and sources of the variables used in the regression models 560 
Respondent-specific variables (all sourced from OECD survey) 
Climate change concern 
(dependent variable) 
respondent’s ranking of climate change seriousness on a scale 
from 0 (not at all serious) to 10 (extremely serious) 
Male   respondent’s gender: takes the value 1 if the respondent is a male, and 0 otherwise 
Age respondent’s age measured in number of years 
Higher education 
respondent's education: takes the value 1 if the respondent 
completed one or more years of education after high school, 0 
otherwise 
Personal safety ranking 
respondent’s ranking of the seriousness of personal safety 
issues among a list of six issues in total (international 
tensions, economic concerns, environmental concerns, health 
concerns, social issues, and personal safety). These six issues 
were ranked from 1 (most important) to 6 (least important). 
The variable b2_rank_safety corresponds to the ranking 
attributed by the respondent 
Trust experts 
respondent's opinion on trustworthiness with regard to 
information on claims about the environmental impact of 
products, coming from researchers, scientists, and experts, on 
scale from 0 (not at all trustworthy) to 10 (very trustworthy) 
Charity giving 
takes the value 1 if the respondent has supported or 
participated in the activities of charitable organisations 
(includes membership, personal time, and/or financial 
donations), 0 otherwise 
Local environment 
satisfaction 
respondent's average level of satisfaction towards air quality, 
water quality (in lakes, rivers, sea), access to green spaces, 
level of noise, and management of litter and rubbish in his/her 
local environment. For each of these five items the 
respondent indicated satisfaction on a five-degree scale: −2 
(very dissatisfied) to 2 (very satisfied). The index is the 
average of the five scores 
Conservative ideology 
takes the value 1 if the respondent agreed or strongly agreed 
with the following two statements: “Environmental issues 
should be dealt with primarily by future generations” and 
“Environmental issues will be resolved primarily through 
technological progress”, 0 otherwise 
Household-specific variables (all sourced from OECD survey) 
Children takes the value 1 if there is at least one household member who is below 18 years of age, 0 otherwise 
Income household annual after tax income in thousand USD  
Urban location takes the value 1 if the household lives in a major town/city or in a suburban area, 0 otherwise 
Energy use monitored takes the value 1 if the household pays for electricity according to how much electricity is used, 0 otherwise 
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Adopt energy-efficient 
equipment 
index measuring adoption of energy-efficient equipment over 
the last 10 years (0-100 scale)  
Country-specific variables (various sources) 
Gross national income per capita Gross National Income in 2011, in thousand USD (World Bank) 
Overall readiness score 
The Environmental Performance Index (0-100 scale) ranks 
how well countries perform on high-priority environmental 
issues in two broad policy areas: protection of human health 
(e.g., child mortality, air pollution, access to drinking water 
and sanitation) and protection of ecosystems (e.g., wastewater 
treatment, pesticide regulation, changes in forest cover, fish 
stocks, carbon intensity trends). A higher index indicates a 
better protection (http://epi.yale.edu/) 
Environmental 
performance index 
“Readiness measures a country’s ability to leverage 
investments and convert them to adaptation actions. ND-
GAIN (Notre Dame – Global Action Initiative) measures 
overall readiness by considering three components – 
economic readiness, governance readiness and social 
readiness”8 (ND-GAIN 
(http://index.gain.org/about/methodology) 
Extreme climate % 
Average percentage of the population that was affected by 
natural disasters classified as either droughts, floods, or 
extreme temperature events in 2009 (World Bank9) 
Floods Number of floods recorded from 1985-2011 (Gassert et al. 2013; World Resources Institute) 
Mean temperature (5 years 
previous) 
Mean temperature over the years 2006-2010 (source: 
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/data-access) 
Mean temperature ratio 
(100 years previous) 
Ratio of mean temperature over 2006-2010 to mean 
temperature over 1911-2010 
Right party Takes the value 1 if the main orientation of the political party 
ruling the government in 2011 is classified as “right” 
including parties that are defined as conservative/Christian 
democratic/right-wing; (World Bank Database of Political 
Institutions; Beck et al. 2001) 
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8Additional notes from ND-GAIN: “Economic readiness captures the ability of a country's business environment 
to accept investment that could be applied to adaptation that reduces vulnerability (reduces sensitivity and 
improves adaptive capacity). Governance readiness captures the institutional factors that enhance application of 
investment for adaptation. Social readiness captures the factors such as social inequality, Information and 
Communication Technology infrastructure, education, and innovation that enhance the mobility of investment 
and promote adaptation actions.” 
9Additional notes from the World Bank: “A drought is an extended period of time characterized by a deficiency 
in a region's water supply that is the result of constantly below average precipitation. Extreme temperature events 
are either cold waves or heat waves. Population affected is the number of people injured, left homeless or 
requiring immediate assistance during a period of emergency resulting from a natural disaster; it can also include 
displaced or evacuated people.” Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.CLC.MDAT.ZS 
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Table A2. Summary household statistics (n=10,162) 562 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Respondent-specific variables    
Climate change concern 7.64 2.20 0 10 
Male   0.51 0.50 0 1 
Age 42.19 13.63 18 69 
Higher education 0.79 0.41 0 1 
Personal safety ranking 4.24 1.56 1 6 
Trust experts 7.03 1.92 0 10 
Charity giving 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Local environment 
satisfaction -0.13 1.19 -2.0 1.8 
Conservative ideology 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Household-specific variables 
Children 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Income (USD) 49,133 32,029 2,985 206,145 
Urban location 0.66 0.47 0 1 
Energy use monitored 0.92 0.27 0 1 
Adopt energy-efficient 
equipment 35.54 27.11 0 100 
Country-specific variables 
Gross national income 42,771 17,280 12,290 79,320 
Overall readiness 
score 74.41 6.98 63.55 88.17 
Environmental 
performance index 0.75 0.07 0.64 0.86 
Extreme climate % 0.36 0.85 0.00 3.05 
Floods 2.52 0.79 0.35 3.47 
Mean temperature (5 
years previous) 10.47 7.05 -4.40 21.74 
Mean temperature ratio 
(100 years previous) 1.08 0.13 0.81 1.38 
Right party 0.56 0.50 0 1 
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